This research examines the success of stabilization policies to control hyperinflation in Bolivia.
Introduction
Hyperinflation, where monthly inflation rates exceed 50 percent (Cagan, 1956) , became a major economic problem in the 1980's in many less developed countries (LDCS) and continues to plague LDCS today (New~frica, April, 1994) . Agriculture, a key sector for LDCS, often accounts for 40-50 percent of gross domestic product and employs a significant portion of the work force (Hadwiger, 1992) . However, LDCS have historically taxed the agricultural sector while developed countries (DCS) have protected it (Webb, Lopez, and Penn, 1990; Valdes, 1993; McCalla and Josling, 1985; Hadwiger, 1992; and Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes, 1991) .' Along with taxation policies, developing countries have historically instituted distortionary macroeconomic policies, often with good intentions, such as raising revenues to pay off international debt, but with unintentional destabilizing consequences (World Bank).
Such distortionary macroeconomic policies favored the industrial sector at the expense of the agricultural sector via direct and indirect protection, These destabilizing policies resulted in ( 1) hyperinflation;
(2) overvalued exchange rates, which suppressed agricultural exports making them relatively more expensive to potential importers; (3) distorted prices, providing subsidies to the urban sector while taxing the rural, agricultural sector; and (4) reduced investment in agriculture. Since agricultural products are a This article estimates and compares the money demand functions during the hyperinflation and the stabilization periods in Bolivia.
It also analyzes the importance of factors underlying the changes in the demand for money in the two periods.
Finally, the implications of stabilization policies on agriculture, with particular focus on agricultural exports, are discussed.2
The Case of Bolivia
During the 1980s, Bolivia suffered two major economic events: ( 1) hyperinflation, where the average annual inflation rate peaked at 8,169 percent in 1985 (Pastor, 1991) and (2) government stabilization policies, instituted to restore confidence in Bolivia's currency and stimulate economic growth by controlling hyperinflation. Table 1 illustrates average annual inflation rates in selected developing countries as well as corresponding macroeconomic policies used to control inflation. Specifically, Bolivia faced an economic crisis culminating in hyperinflation from the later part of 1984 through mid-1985 (Melvin, 1988; Pastor, 1991)3 . A large fiscaI deficit, negative growth rates, high unemployment rates, as well as exchange rate and balance of payment problems characterized this crisis. These problems were generated in the mid-1970s when the prevailing administration over bonrowed from foreign countries, increased Bolivia's fiscal deficit, and discouraged domestic investment coupled with a high degree of government intervention as exemplified by ( 1) fixed prices for many products, (2) fixed exchange rates, (3) fixed interest rates, and (4) fixed wage increases in the private sector. Also, regulations prohibited laying off workers and restrictions precluded holding foreign currency and conducting financial transactions in foreign currency.
These problems exacerbated in 1984, when export prices decreased significantly, droughts and floods were common, and the economy faced a negative growth rate troughing at -6.5 percent (Pastor, 1991) . The domestic currency suffered continuous devaluations at a rate of 50 percent per month in 1985. Also, a great shortage of basic goods existed, Bolivians lost 185 confidence in their domestic currency leading to an increased demand for U.S. dollars, resulting in a dramatic increase in the exchange rate (Melvin, 1988) .
After August 1985, Bolivia's economy became less regulated.
New stabilization policies included the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
Interest rates:
Regulations were completely removed.
Exchange rales:
Regulations were completely removed and a floating cxchangc rate system was implemented.
Prices: All regulations on private sector prices were removed.
For goods and services produced by public enterprises, prices were no longer regulated.
Wages and employment:
Only a minimum wage was administered and employers were allowed to lay off workers.
Fiscal deficit:
The objective of reducing the government deficit was attained by laying off government workers and reducing public expenditures.
Foreign Currency:
Individuals were free to make financial transactions in foreign currency and could now hold foreign currency.
Subsidies: All subsidies were removed.
As a result of these new policies, the Bolivian economy changed dramatically during and after the hyperinflation period. Figure I shows monthly inflation rates both before and after stabilization policies were implemented. Although these new rules restored the economic equilibrium in a few months, the subsequent recession lasted for more than two years (Pastor, 199 1) .
Bolivians now faced with a different economic framework should adjust their nominal money holdings such that their real purchasing power remains unchanged (Barron, et al., 1989) . However, rapid changes in the inflation rate introduce uncertainty, such that the quality of a given stock of real money balances is reduced, De la Barra, Marchatr[ and I.vlmka S[ahi/iza/ion Polioe.v and Agricultural [mpacts m Developing Countries Devaluation of official exchange rate (settlement of 50% of exports and cash grants at the official rate with the other 50% settled at the exchange agency rate), bank reserve requirements increased to channel resourms tn key productive activities, interest rates on Iendmg and borrowing increased, taxes increased and wages adjusted Reductvd production costs, reduced interest rates and tax burden of businesses and individuals, revived domestic output and demand with expansive monetary and fiscal policies, maintained overvalued exchange rate in order to make imported inputs less expensive, and exchange controls reinforced to ensure availability of foreign exchange for economic recoveŨ RUGUAY 50 84 Reduced public sector deficit with measurer designed to control IJre rise in spending, periodic adJtIStm~tS of rates and prices for public sctwices, limited tie money supply growth, wage adjustments with workers and employers every four months, monitored movements of international resctves and changes in exchange rate, negotiated new terms for servicing external public debt where the quality of money is defined as the,flow of monetary services (Klein, 1977) , If the quality of money rises, the same monetary services can be obtained using less real money balances; the reverse would be true if the quality of money declined, Thus, we can identify two opposing effects of hyperinflation on the real demand for local currency: ( I) Hyperinflation reduces the quality of money, which leads to an increased demand for real local currency, i.e., the income gflect. (2) As is true for hyperinflation, inflation induces substitution from local currency to other financial assets with higher real rates of return, such that the substitution ejjlect reduces the demand for local currency. Consequently, the final impact of hyperinflation is uncertain (Klein, 1977; Asilis, et al., 1993) . 
Conceptual Framework
The basis of our conceptual model stemmed from the "classic" money demand function, which specifies a direct relationship exists between real money demand and real income, and an inverse relationship between real money demand and interest rates. Incorporating results from the following researchers, the classic model was augmented to include additional explanatory variables, such as lagged moneav demand, to account for dynamic adjustment (Cuthbertson and Taylor, 1990) ; inflation, to capture the effect of price increases (Cesarano, 199 I; Branson, 1989) ; the wage rate, as a proxy for the value of time (Dawd, 1990; Becker, 1976) ; and exchange rates, as a hedge against inflation. Based on economic theory and building upon research results presented above, six regressors were chosen to estimate the real, short-run money demand function for Bolivia as specified below in the parent Cobb-Douglas function:
nominal money demand a price index the real interest rate exchange rate expressed in units of Bolivian currency per U.S. dollar real national income real national wage rates parameters for i = O, .... 6 disturbance term The subscript (-1 ) is a one period lag As described in the "classic" money demand function in equation (1), we expect a positive relationship between real income and real money demand and a negative relationship between real interes( rates and real money demand. However, it is important to point out that the use of
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banks in Bolivia is not widespread.
As such, the demand for money may not be as responsive to interest rate changes (Kelfala, 1992 A positive relationship is expected, As stated earlier, the effect of injlation on the real demand for money is uncertain due to the opposing substitution and income effects. The average wage rate is hypothesized to be positively correlated with the demand for money.
According to economic theory, an increase in wages leads to an increase in money demand for both transaction and speculative purposes (Barron, et al., 1989) .
The exchange rate appears to be an important determinant of money demand, In Bolivia, the exchange rate constituted and still constitutes the most reliable means of hedging against inflation.
Through a market determined exchange rate, Bolivians maintain or may improve their purchasing power by holding wealth in foreign currency. Consequently, the exchange rate captures the speculative demand for money with the U.S. dollar being the most important alternative financial asset. On this basis, the exchange rate should be negatively related to the demand for local currency. For income, we used monthly government expenditures, since the government is a major employer and therefore an important source of income. The use of government expenditures to estimate the demand for money is supported by Deravi, et al., who used government expenditures to proxy wealth.
EmpiricaI Procedures
For expected inflation, a lagged price variable was used, where inflation in the current period is expected to be at least be as high as in the previous period.
Empirical analysis estimates the demand for money in two different time periods, the hyperinflation period, September 1983-August 1985, and the stabilization period, September 1985-March 1988. Empirical results are used to test whether Bolivia's money demand after stabilization differed from the previous hyperinflation period using the Chow test (Kmenta, 1986) . Furthermore, the composition of significant parameters is compared for the two time periods, A log-linear functional transformation for both periods was used to estimate equation ( 1) based on the specifications cited in the above literature review. The transformed model is as specified below (note subscripts indicating observations have been omitted for clarity):
J. Agr, and Applied Econ,, July, 1995 Period 11 (Stabilization) 
A4D(_l)
In (~) = lny,, + y, ln(~) (-1)
where previous definitions hold and Y, = parameters for i = O, .... 6 4 = disturbance term
Empirical Results and Discussion
Empirical results for equations (2) and (3) are shown in table 2. Models were estimated using ordinary least squares analysis (OLS) on "SAS" software.
The empirical model was tested for multicollinearity and autocorrelation. Due to the presence of multicollinearity, the lagged price index regressor was dropped, but its presence remains, since it is embedded within the real lagged money demand regressor.
Listed below each parameter estimate is its corresponding t-value, which appears in parentheses.
Also listed are the adjusted coefficients of determination (Adj. R*), the F values, the Durbin's "h" test statistics (D W,,), and the maximum variance inflation factors (Max VIF) to measure multicollinearity (Kmenta, pp. 438, 1986 ).
Chow Test
One of the objectives of this research is to determine whether the demand for money changed during the stabilization period relative to the hyperinflation period. The Chow test was used to verify this hypothesis (Kmenta, 1986 (2) and (3) at the one percent level of significance, These results imply a difference in money demand between the two periods indicating that Bolivian's had greater faith in their domestic currency and that stabilization policies were successful.
Thus, we conclude that the demand for money in Bolivia changed after stabilization policies were implemented, indicating that the new government's objectives for economic growth and controlling hyperinflation were met in the short run. In Bolivia, the successful stabilization of the economy has had significant positive implications. these estimates differ.
For example, prior to 1987, real economic growth
I90
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was negative.
Since then, economic growth has been positive and stable (figure 2). For agriculture, new policies have significantly stabilized the variability of its economic growth, which also has been positive since 1987 excluding drought-related declines in 1989 and 1990. In addition, the agricultural export share relative to total exports rose from 3.7 percent in 1984 to a peak of 31.2 percent in 1990 as stabilization policies corrected for overvalued exchange rates (figure 3).
Overall Statistical Sign(j?cance
The overall relationship among variables for each of the above time periods was significant as indicated by the respective correlation coefficients and F tests. The statistical significance of our empirical results were dramatically improved over Asilis, where our lowest adjusted R2 was 71 percent, while Asilis reported an R2 of 35 percent. From the empirical results, the models explained 7 I percent and 93 percent of the variation in real money demand for the hyperinflation and stabilization periods, respectively. The model explains more variation and has more significant parameters during the stabilization period compared to both the hyperinflation period and the pooled data.
Lagged Money Demand
As expected, the relationship between money demand and lagged money demand was positive for both periods, The parameters (PI and l'1)~correspond to elasticities, since the Cobb. Douglas function was used, Thus, the elasticity of money demand with respect to the lagged money demand during hyperinflation was higher (0.48) than that for the stabilization period (0.39); the same applies for the standard error.
These numbers indicate that during hyperinflation, Bolivians adjusted their real money holdings much faster. Uncertainty about the future, as reflected by a higher standard error during the hyperinflation period may have contributed to this behavior. A smaller expected (-0.08), but it was positive for the standard error during the stabilization period implies hyperinflation period, (y2 = O.14). Both elasticities again that the uncertainty faced during the were nevertheless small. These results reflect the hyperinflation period diminished afier September
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1985.
A stable and growing economy attracts foreign investment. Foreign investment leads to the development of technology and infrastructure, which in turn leads to an increase in productivity and efficiency for the overall economy, including agriculture.
Income
Government expenditures was used as a proxy for national income, since the government is a major employer and therefore an important source of income. Nevertheless, the relationship between the demand for money and government expenditures was found to be direct, as expected, The elasticities of money demand with respect to government expenditures (~~= O.I 1 and yq = O.19), were significant but rather low.
Wages
Parameters for real wages in both periods, 5 = 0.07 and y, = 0.4, were positive. Money demand was more responsive to wages after stabilization, as expected. During hyperinflation, a rise in wages lead to a less than proportional increase in the demand for local currency, since wages could be saved in alternative assets. The standard error for wages in the hypcrinflation period is proportionally greater than the standard cm-or for the stabilization period, reflecting more uncertainty in the former period. Since the agricultural sector employs a significant portion of LDC workers, growth in agriculture leads to an increase in employment.
In Bolivia, as in many developing countries, agriculture accounts for over 20 percent of gross domestic product and employed nearly half of the work force in 1991 (U.S. Department of State, 1991).
Exchange Rates
The exchange rate parameters for both periods, (13J and (yJ, were negative, as expected. Although both parameters were small (O. I and 0.08), the exchange rate was highly significant during hyperinflation but not significant during stabilization.
Exchange rates were more relevant in determining money demand during hyperinflation discquilibria than during the stabilization period. During hypcrinflation, Bolivians did not want to hold their domestic currency for long periods of time. As such, an excess demand for goods and foreign currency developed.
Government policy introduced exchange control, consequently, a nonofficial parallel market for foreign currency developed, particularly for the U.S. dollar. During 1984 During -1985 , the U.S. dollar replaced the domestic currency in many of its functions, including as a means for payment. The gap between the official and non-official exchange rates increased rapidly, while the value of the Bolivian currency dccreascd.
Summary and Conclusions
This research estimated money demand functions for two different time periods, the hyperinflation period and the stabilization period. Empirical results for each time period were compared to determine ( 1) whether Bolivia's demand for money differed during the two time periods, (2) whether the composition of significant variables influencing money demand changed, and (3) the implications of stabilization policies on agriculture.
The Chow test indicated a definite structural change between the two periods. Furthermore, the composition of significant parameters changed. During hyperinflation, lagged money demand, exchange rates and government expenditures were statistically significant. After stabilization, significant parameters included the above parameters, as well as real wages. Elasticities with respect to lagged money demand, interest rates and exchange rates were higher during the hyperinflation period, indicating that the real demand for money was more responsive to changes in these parameters. Uncertainty during hyperinflation was reflected by larger standard errors for lagged money demand, interest rates and wage rates. In general, this model provides more predictive power during the stabilization period.
For agriculture, we have seen that ( I ) agriculture is a significant portion of the economy in many developing countries and employs a significant portion of the workforce; (2) LDCS have historically taxed their agricultural sector both directly and indirectly--with indirect taxation often exceeding direct taxation; (3) WCII meaning macroeconomic policies instituted by LDCS have suppressed agricultural exports through over valued exchange rates; and (4) stabilization policies that removed economic distortions and regulations in Boliwa have increased the demand for domestic currency and resulted in economic growth for the where agricultural exports are no longer penalized overall economy as well as the agricultural sector, with over valued exchange rates.
